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Local merchant guilds were ubiquitous in medieval Europe, and their development was inextricably linked with the 
development of towns and the rise of the merchant class. We develop a theory of the emergence of local 
merchant guilds as an efficient mechanism to implement collusion among merchants and rulers, building on the 
natural complementarity between merchants’ market trading and mutual monitoring. Our model explains the main 
observed features of local merchant guilds. behavior, their rules and internal organization, including membership 
restrictions and exclusion, and their relationship with rulers. Moreover, it identifies the main channels through 
which the guilds’ social capital influenced their ability to collude with rulers, and hence social welfare. As we show, 
the available historical evidence supports our theory, shedding new light on the role of the guilds’ social capital. 
We then extend the model to analyze the key trade-offs faced by rulers in choosing whether to grant recognition 
to one or multiple guilds. This provides an additional rationale for the establishment of the alien merchant guilds 
first analyzed by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994), helping us to understand the observed distribution of guilds 
and their characteristics. 
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Since the pioneering work by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) (henceforth GMW),
merchant guilds have attracted considerable attention by economists, and for good rea-
son: this celebrated historical institution dominated trade for several centuries, and its
development was inextricably linked with the growth of medieval towns and the rise of the
merchant class. The merchant guild has also been viewed by many as a shining example
of social capital1, bringing major economic and social bene￿ts ￿suggesting a very valu-
able potential role for such social capital even in modern (e.g. development or transition)
economies.2
Is this very positive view of merchant guilds￿social capital justi￿ed, and if so, what
made their social capital particularly valuable? We address this question theoretically
and empirically. We begin by shedding new light on the reasons for the emergence of
merchant guilds, and on the role played by these guilds. In a nutshell, the main idea
here is that merchant guilds emerged as an e¢ cient mechanism to implement collusion
among merchants and rulers, building on the natural complementarity between merchants￿
market trading and mutual monitoring. Because of this complementarity, rulers seeking to
extract surplus from trade found it advantageous to rely on merchant associations (guilds),
able to monitor e⁄ectively the trading activities of members and non-members, rather than
employing other parties to monitor and collect taxes from merchants. However, guilds
could only generate su¢ cient surplus for rulers by sustaining pro￿table, collusive market
outcomes: this in turn required that only guild members be allowed to trade. Moreover,
it implied an upper bound on guild membership, which in some circumstances entailed
membership restrictions and exclusion. As we demonstrate in Section 2, our theory is
supported by a substantial body of historical evidence on merchant guilds￿behavior, on
the privileges they obtained from rulers and the transfers they made to rulers, and on
their internal norms and organization, including membership restrictions.
What role did the guilds￿social capital play, and what were its welfare implications?
When applied to groups or networks, such as merchant guilds, the notion of social capital3
typically refers to cohesion and trust among members, and to their resulting ability to
enforce group norms and engage in e⁄ective collective action. In this sense, as discussed
in Section 2, merchant guilds did indeed possess substantial social capital. Our analy-
sis identi￿es several channels through which this social capital a⁄ected the relationship
1See for example Putnam et al. (1993).
2On this see Bardhan (1996), Dasgupta (2000), Raiser (2001) and Stiglitz (1999).
3For de￿nitions see, among others, Bourdieu,1986; Coleman, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999; Dasgupta and
Serageldin, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2000; as well as Sobel, 2002
for an excellent discussion.
2between guilds and rulers, and social welfare. The main trade-o⁄ is readily apparent by
considering the simplest and most widespread case, that of a single merchant guild in a
given polity. In this case, a high level of social capital within the guild could generate
important e¢ ciency gains through its e⁄ect on the guild￿ s monitoring ability. In particu-
lar, cohesion and trust among guild members facilitated coordination on e¢ cient internal
and external monitoring. Internal monitoring ensured that members who deviated from
guild norms were detected, while external monitoring detected non-members attempting
to undermine the guild￿ s monopoly over local trade, granted by the ruler, as documented
in Section 2. Both types of monitoring were crucial in sustaining the guild￿ s ability to ex-
tract surplus from trade; indeed, alien merchants coming to English towns "were carefully
watched, lest they should sell or buy under colour or cover of a faithless gild-brother￿ s
freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity, or otherwise severely punished, if
found guilty of this o⁄ence" (Gross, 1890, p.48).
The reason is simple: medieval rulers could, and did, give legal legitimacy to the guilds￿
norms and privileges; however, their enforcement required monitoring to detect (and
hence punish) deviations. It would have been very costly for rulers to hire third parties
as monitors. Because of the complementarity between trading and monitoring trade,
signi￿cant reductions in monitoring costs could be achieved if guild members undertook
internal and external monitoring themselves, provided they possessed su¢ cient cohesion
(social capital) to do so e¢ ciently. On the other hand, cohesion and trust among guild
members also increased their bargaining power in negotiating with rulers, and hence their
ability to secure a share of the surplus from trade. Thus in some circumstances, high levels
of social capital within the guild, combined with restrictions on membership, generated
substantial inequality between guild members, who earned large rents, and all those who
were excluded from membership. A trade-o⁄ therefore emerged between the e¢ ciency
and equity implications of the guilds￿social capital.
Our model presents a very di⁄erent, although potentially complementary, theory of
the emergence and role of merchant guilds relative to GMW. The reason is that GMW
developed a theory of alien merchant guilds; that is, associations of alien merchants
supported by the rulers of the polities in which they traded. In their model, individual
alien merchants trading in a medieval polity were potentially vulnerable to attacks and
expropriation. This made it impossible to sustain e¢ cient trade in the absence of a
credible commitment by the polity￿ s ruler to provide commercial security. GMW argued
that merchant guilds emerged as a solution to this commitment problem: by organizing
themselves in associations which could enforce trade embargoes in response to misbehavior
by rulers, merchants were able to obtain commercial security. Moreover, rulers were willing
3to support such organizations of alien merchants precisely because they made it possible
to sustain e¢ cient trade.
Historically though, as discussed in Section 2, most merchant guilds emerged as local
merchant guilds, i.e., associations of local merchants that obtained recognition and privi-
leges (including monopoly power over local trade) from their local rulers. Alien merchant
guilds were typically formed by the members of local merchant guilds who were active in
long-distance trade, and remained under the control and supervision of the guilds from
the merchants￿polities of origin. Moreover, only a subset of local merchant guilds went
on to form such foreign ￿ branches￿ , primarily in the main international trade centers. It is
therefore of considerable interest to understand the economic rationale for the emergence
of local merchant guilds, and the reasons why medieval rulers were willing to grant them
recognition and privileges, as documented in Section 2.
This is all the more important as local merchants dominated medieval towns, many
of which acquired considerable power and autonomy: thus understanding the roots of
merchants￿organizations and their relationships with rulers is crucial in understanding
the wider political economy forces that shaped the development of towns and states.
Indeed, it would be di¢ cult to consider medieval merchant organizations and towns in
isolation from each other: in England4, for example, charters were often granted by rulers
to towns (boroughs), establishing the burgesses￿right to a merchant guild with monopoly
power over local trade, and at the same time exempting them from a variety of taxes,
while requiring an annual ￿xed payment.5 Surviving records of proceedings following
the grant of such charters con￿rm the very close link between merchant associations and
towns.6
For this reason, and to keep our analysis as simple as possible, the model we develop
in Section 3 abstracts from the distinction between guilds and towns. We focus instead
on the key relationship, the dynamic game between the ruler of a medieval polity and a
large number of potentially active merchants.7 In the absence of merchant organizations,
4The point applies with equal force to other countries such as France, Germany and Italy; on this see,
among others, Dollinger (1970), Racine (2004) and Spruyt (1994).
5Thus many charters contained a clause similar to the following: "We grant a Gild Merchant ... so
that... no one who is not of the Gild may merchandise in the said town, except with the consent of the
burgesses" (Gross, p.8). Tax exemptions included "tall and stallage, lastage, passage, pontage, and all
other customs"; in return, the burgesses would pay "annually at our Exchequer the right and customary
ferm" (Gross, p.5, citing the charter given by King John to the town of Ipswich in 1200).
6For example, records of proceedings in Ipswich following the grant of the charter by King John
detail the various elections that took place to appoint o¢ cers to govern the town and the Gild; they
also document the requirement for "all who are of the freedom of the town" (i.e. enjoying the privileges,
including tax exemptions, granted by the king) to "give their hanse to the said Gild" (i.e. make payments)
(Gross, pp.23-25).
7For simplicity we also abstract from another important historical observation: in some cases, notably
4the ruler hires a local agent to monitor trade and collect taxes on realized revenues from
this trade. In each period, merchants individually decide whether to collude, deviate,
or punish deviations (compete ￿ la Bertrand), in the spirit of Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986). Our ￿rst result is that collusion among merchants is helped by the presence of
the tax-collector. The reason is that higher pro￿ts are taxed more, thereby reducing the
potential gain from deviation.
However, the tax-collector regime is costly because the agent has to be induced to
monitor and collect taxes. If collusion among merchants can be sustained in the absence
of a tax-collector, the ruler can increase his revenues by granting a monopoly over local
trade to an association (￿ guild￿ ) of merchants, in return for a transfer.8 Indeed, this is
exactly what happened in very many polities. For this to work, the number of merchants
belonging to the guild cannot exceed an endogenous threshold level n(￿), since increasing
membership beyond this threshold would reduce each member￿ s share of current and
future collusive pro￿ts too much relative to the static gain from a deviation, making it
impossible to sustain collusion. For simplicity, we assume that deviations are perfectly
detected, and punished by exclusion from the guild. Clearly the result will continue to
hold if we allow for additional punishments (e.g. ￿nes, jail, con￿scation of property) and
imperfect detection, as long as there is a positive expected static gain from deviation.9
This result provides a rationale for the restrictions on membership that were often imposed
by guilds. At the same time, in our model guild membership cannot fall below a second
threshold n, because a very small number of guild members would not be able to monitor
e⁄ectively and hence prevent the potential (uno¢ cial and forbidden by the ruler) trading
many Italian city-states, the distinction between merchants and rulers was itself blurred, as the rulers
were essentially merchant oligarchies. As we discuss in section 6, this can be viewed as an extreme
case of our theory, where collusion between ruler and merchants becomes (almost) perfect. Many of the
qualitative insights and predictions of our analysis continue to hold in this case, and are con￿rmed by
the historical evidence.
8Dessi and Ogilvie (2003), in never published work, developed a simple model of merchant guilds in
which local rulers grant recognition and privileges to associations of local merchants in order to maximize
their ￿scal revenue from trade. In their model, giving monopoly power over local trade to a guild, in
return for an appropriate transfer, yields a higher revenue for the ruler than hiring a local agent to collect
taxes on trade. The reason is that the agent, who has better information than the ruler concerning
local demand shocks, will be able to earn informational rents ex post; moreover, he is assumed to be
capital-constrained and hence unable to pay for these expected rents ex ante. In contrast, it is assumed
that a su¢ ciently large group of merchants, by pooling their resources, will be able to pay the required
ex-ante fee to the ruler, who can therefore extract all the surplus from trade. While there is considerable
historical evidence that medieval tax-collectors were often capital-constrained, it might be argued that
this problem could have been solved through associations of tax-collectors rather than merchant guilds.
Our model, in contrast, provides a rationale for the emergence of merchant guilds that does not require
tax-collectors to be capital-constrained: the key is the complementarity between trading and monitoring
trade.
9On the other hand, rulers would not have allowed extreme punishments, reserved for greater o⁄ences.
5activities of the many excluded merchants. This second threshold, as noted earlier, will
depend on the degree of trust and cohesion among guild members, and the extent to which
they are able to overcome free-riding incentives and cooperate to monitor e⁄ectively ￿in
other words, on their social capital.
We therefore obtain two results concerning the ruler￿ s choice between the tax-collector
regime and the guild regime. For su¢ ciently high values of the discount factor ￿, the
ruler always prefers the guild regime: Intuitively, it is easier to sustain collusion in the
guild regime when merchants are more patient. For lower values of the discount factor, the
choice will depend on the relative e¢ ciency of the tax-collector￿ s and the guild￿ s monitoring
technologies - which in turn depends on the quality of social capital. When the guild
regime is chosen, the ruler and the guild bargain over how to share the resulting surplus.
In particular, although the ruler will obviously obtain at least as much revenue as under
the tax-collector regime, the guild may be able to secure a strictly positive share of the
surplus. This will be the case when its members have su¢ cient cohesion, and there is no
easy replacement for the guild. In the presence of membership restrictions, the result will
be that a subset of potentially active merchants, the members of the guild, will be able
to trade and earn strictly positive rents, while the remainder will be excluded from trade
and obtain only their reservation utility. This illustrates the implications of the guild￿ s
social capital for equity and e¢ ciency: in terms of e¢ ciency, more social capital among
the guild members increases the guild￿ s monitoring ability, which may help to sustain
e¢ cient collusion, and avoid the need for costly monitoring by the tax collector. In
terms of equity, more social capital reduces the guild￿ s minimum size, while increasing its
bargaining power; this results in higher inequality between (possibly fewer) guild members
and (possibly more numerous) excluded merchants.
Historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds shows that in some cases rulers
granted recognition and privileges to more than one guild; for example, to a local mer-
chant guild and to one or more alien merchant guilds. Existing theoretical models o⁄er
no explanation for this: GMW, for instance, predict that it is optimal for the ruler to
recognize a single guild.10 In Section 5, we extend our analysis to study the trade-o⁄
faced by the ruler in choosing between recognizing one or two guilds. This is based on
two main e⁄ects. The ￿rst is the e⁄ect on monitoring e¢ ciency: by allowing each guild
to target its monitoring so as to exploit its informational comparative advantage, recog-
nizing two guilds instead of one may generate ￿economies of scale￿in monitoring. This in
turn relaxes the minimum size constraint for each guild, making it easier to provide the
individual incentives required to sustain e¢ cient collusion. For example, consider a city
10This is also true for Dessi and Ogilvie (2003).
6such as Bruges, with its own local merchant guild and possibly an alien guild of merchants
from, say, Genoa. Local guild members may have a comparative advantage in detecting
"misbehavior" by other local merchants, while members of the Genoese guild may have
a comparative advantage in detecting misbehavior by other Italian merchants. Overall,
monitoring may then be more e¢ cient if both guilds obtain recognition.
The second e⁄ect works in the opposite direction: in the presence of multiple guilds,
there is an additional incentive constraint that needs to be satis￿ed. Speci￿cally, members
of each guild should not have a collective incentive to deviate from e¢ cient collusion. A
key variable here is the probability ￿ that the two guilds recartelize following a deviation:
the higher this probability, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We therefore ￿nd that
rulers are more likely to grant recognition and privileges to multiple guilds when ￿ is
lower, and when each guild￿ s social capital provides a monitoring advantage relative to
a particular set of excluded merchants and potential uno¢ cial trading activities. This
result may help to explain why the establishment of a single guild of local merchants
was the norm, while additional guilds of alien merchants were able to obtain recognition
and privileges in a number of polities, and notably in important centers of international
trade such as Constantinople or Bruges. Intuitively in the latter cases, national and
cultural homogeneity within each of the guilds helped to generate the required internal
cohesion and social capital, while heterogeneity across guilds made it di¢ cult for trust to
be restored after a deviation, reducing the probability of recartelization.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this Section discusses further
the relationship with the existing literature. Section 2 reviews the historical evidence
on merchant guilds that will motivate our theoretical analysis. Our baseline model is
introduced in Section 3. We then study the choice between the tax-collector regime and
the guild regime in Section 4. The trade-o⁄ between establishing one or two guilds is
examined in Section 5. We review the main implications of our theory and relate them to
the historical evidence in Section 6. Our concluding remarks are contained in Section 7.
1.1. Relationship to the literature
Beyond the literature on merchant guilds in economics, discussed above, this paper is
clearly related to two other important literatures.
First, our paper is obviously related to the literature on social capital. An impor-
tant strand of this literature has studied the link between trust and economic outcomes:
trust appears to be positively correlated with economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997,
Knack and Zack, 2001), with judicial e¢ ciency (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997), with the size of a country￿ s stock market (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
72008), and with cross-country trading patterns (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009)).
The determinants of trust (and trustworthiness) at the individual level have also been
investigated (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter,
2000), as well as the determinants of participation in social activities in more or less het-
erogeneous communities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). The relationship between trust
and economic performance at the individual level has been explored by Butler, Giuliano
and Guiso (2009). Yet another approach has been developed by Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2004), who study the link between social capital and ￿nancial development,
using electoral participation and blood donation as measures of social capital. These
studies have focused primarily on generalized trust and civic engagement, which corre-
spond broadly to the notion of ￿ bridging￿social capital used by sociologists. Our paper
di⁄ers in this respect by focusing instead on an example of ￿ group￿social capital, closer
to the sociologists￿notion of ￿ bonding￿social capital. A key issue of interest here, of
course, is the relationship between these two forms of social capital. Indeed, some of
the very positive views that have been expressed about merchant guilds￿social capital
might be interpreted as positing a substantial degree of complementarity between the two
(e.g. Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). Our theoretical analysis, on the other hand,
suggests the opposite, and is consistent with the historical evidence reviewed in Section
2 and Section 6.
Second, our analysis shares also common features from the literature on collusion in
oligopolies. Our paper is closest in spirit to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986): in modeling
the dynamic interaction between merchants we allow, as they did in studying oligopolistic
￿rms, for the possibility of fully e¢ cient or ine¢ cient collusion, depending on the realiza-
tion of market demand. In our model though, monitoring abilities (and the social capital
that generates them) play a crucial role, which was absent in their setting. Indeed, we ￿nd
that the optimality of multiple guilds, in some circumstances, is driven by the possibility
of achieving scale economies in monitoring, by exploiting the monitoring advantage due
to di⁄erent guilds￿social capital. This result is novel, to the best of our knowledge, and
could also apply to other collusive organisations.
2. The historical evidence
This section reviews the historical evidence on merchant guilds, which will motivate our
analysis. In particular, we review the evidence on the origins of merchant guilds, on the
recognition and privileges they received from rulers (notably monopoly power over local
trade, and a variety of tax exemptions), and on the transfers they made to rulers. We then
8discuss the evidence on merchant guilds￿social capital, and especially on the important
role of internal and external monitoring, as well as guild norms intended to help members
secure rents, and sanctions used to discourage members from breaching guild norms.
￿nally, we review the evidence on guild membership restrictions and exclusion.
2.1. Origins of merchant guilds
Most merchant guilds emerged as associations of local merchants. These local merchant
guilds were ubiquitous in medieval Europe, and were supported by their local rulers,
who granted them o¢ cial recognition and a variety of important privileges, including
monopolies over local trade.11 Some of these local merchant guilds then established foreign
branches (￿colonies￿and ￿consulates￿ ) in important trade centers12, when a signi￿cant
number of their members engaged in long-distance trade. However, while very many
European towns had a local merchant guild (in England alone, for example, there were
over one hundred towns with a local merchant guild13), only a small subset of these towns
established colonies or consulates in the main international trade centers.14 These alien
merchant guilds were closely linked to the local merchant guilds of their polities of origin,
on whom they depended for their internal rules and governance, as well as for external
recognition.15
2.2. Recognition and privileges
Local merchant guilds throughout medieval Europe obtained from their rulers a variety of
privileges enabling them to restrict competition and secure rents. These privileges were
sometimes granted as part of charters given to towns, which also gave the towns a degree
of political, administrative and ￿nancial autonomy. This was the case in England, where
many such town charters contained ￿a clause similar to the following: ￿ We grant a Gild
Merchant with a hanse and other customs belonging to the Gild, so that [or ￿ and that￿ ]
no one who is not of the Gild may merchandise in the said town, except with the consent
11See Bernard (1972), p.304; Dilcher (1984), pp. 72-76; Ehbrecht (1985), pp. 430, 449; Racine (1985),
pp. 131-132, 134-138; Schulz (1985), p.411; Sch￿tt (1980), p.79. The privileges granted to local merchant
guilds are discussed below.
12See Planitz (1940), p.19; Racine (1985), pp.134-5; Sch￿tt (1980), p.79; Woodward (2003), p.1.
13See Gross (1890), pp.9-20, for a list of all those for which there is explicit documentary evidence,
many dating back at least to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The actual number is likely to have
been even greater, implying that by the thirteenth century, local merchant guilds were ￿one of the most
prevalent and characteristic features of English municipalities.￿(p.22).
14On this see, among others, Bernard (1972), pp.299, 304-5; Epstein (2000), pp.27-9; Johanek (1999),
pp.72, 76-7; Laiou (2000), pp.811-3; Prevenier (2000), pp.581-2.
15See Abula￿a (1986), pp.530, 537-8; Abula￿a (1997), pp. 54-5; Abula￿a (2000), pp.660-1; Ashtor
(1983), pp.13, 68-9, 78, 149, 411; Blom (1984), pp.20, 25; Choroskevic (1996), pp.71-2, 78, 86.
9of the burgesses￿ ￿ (Gross, 1890, p.8). Thus English local merchant guilds were granted
the right to exclude any non-member from trade. In continental Europe, the granting of
monopoly privileges to local merchant guilds was not always linked to the granting of
greater political autonomy to towns. A good example is the guild of the mercatores aque
(￿water merchants￿ ) in Paris: in 1170, the French king, Philip Augustus, ￿granted them
a virtual monopoly of the Seine tra¢ c between the bridges of Paris and Mantes￿ .16 Yet
under Philip Augustus, ￿Unlike those of most towns in the royal domain, the bourgeois
of Paris were permitted no semblance of autonomy￿ .17
The privileges granted to local merchant guilds in many medieval European cities
meant that alien merchants could be either excluded from trade18, or allowed to trade
only subject to a number of restrictions clearly intended to favor local merchants. Among
the most common of these restrictions were ￿staple￿rights and brokerage rights. Local
guilds￿￿rights of staple￿meant that alien merchants had to bring their merchandise to
municipal warehouses where members of the local merchant guild could buy them at
favorable prices.19 Local guilds￿brokerage rights meant that alien merchants could not
trade directly with consumers or with other alien merchants: they had to use members
of the local merchant guild as intermediaries (brokers).20 Local merchant guilds often
enjoyed several of these privileges: for example, the local merchant guilds in cities such
as Bruges and Cologne enjoyed both staple rights and brokerage rights.21 At the same
time, local merchant guilds could also exclude from trade local individuals who were not
members of the guild.22
16Baldwin (1986), p.348.
17Baldwin (1986), p.349. See also Luchaire (1902), p.239.
18See Hibbert (1963), pp.169-74; Irsigler (1985), p.59; Leguay (2000), p.121; Planitz (1940), p.25;
Postan (1973), pp.189-91; Reyerson (2000), pp.59-60; Schultze (1908), pp.498-502, 506, 523, 526-7;
Spu⁄ord (2000), p.177.
19Bernard (1972), p.302; Kuske (1939); Reyerson (2000), p.58; Schultze (1908), p.500; Volckart and
Mangels (1999), p.444.
20Bernard (1972), p.302; Choroskevic (1996), pp.84-6; Hibbert (1963), p.170; Schultze (1908), pp.498-
502, 506, 523, 526-7; Spu⁄ord (2000), p.177.
21Bahr (1911), pp.21-2; Daenell (1905), p.14; Kuske (1939), pp.40-1; Prevenier (2000), p.593.
22Postan (1973), pp.189-91; Sch￿tt (1980), p.121. For some detailed examples, see Planitz (1940),
pp.25-8, on the Flemish local merchant guild in Ghent and the French local merchant guild in Valenci-
ennes; Schulze (1985), pp.379-81, on the German local merchant guild of Stendal; Sch￿tt (1980), pp.398-9,
on the German merchant guild of Halberstadt; Woodward (2003), p.3, on Catalan and Aragonian local
merchant guilds.
102.3. Taxation and transfers
Local merchant guilds were granted exemptions from a variety of tolls and other taxes,
and made regular direct transfers to their rulers.23 Moreover, the transfers did not vary
systematically with the pro￿tability of trade, which is consistent with the model we de-
velop in Section 3. In England, for example, the same town charters that granted legal
recognition and monopoly privileges to the local merchant guild generally granted exemp-
tions from all tolls and other taxes, in exchange for a ￿xed sum or farm (￿rma burgi) to
be paid annually by the town to the ruler.24 While local guild members enjoyed the right
to trade freely and were generally exempt from all tolls, ￿unfranchised merchants, when
allowed to practise their vocation, were hemmed in on every side by onerous restrictions.
Of these the most irksome was probably the payment of toll on all wares that they were
permitted to buy or sell.￿ 25 Membership of the local merchant guild also carried obliga-
tions of course, notably participation in the town￿ s assessments and payment of pecuniary
charges - which ensured that the ￿rma burgi was duly paid and the privileges granted in
the charter maintained.26
A similar pattern can be observed in France: one of the earliest examples is the town
of St. Omer, which obtained freedom from all tolls and other taxes in 1128 in return for
a ￿xed annual sum or farm.27 The local merchant guild in St. Omer enjoyed a variety of
monopolistic privileges and contributed to the provision of local public goods.28 In Spain,
local merchant guilds made regular payments to the ruler in return for their privileges,
obtained exemptions from tolls, and collaborated in the collection and administration of
taxes on trade.29
2.4. Social capital
Cohesion and trust among members of the same merchant guild were fostered by repeated
and close interaction in a range of di⁄erent domains - economic, social and religious.
Regular social gatherings, including assemblies and feasts, were very common, and often
23For examples see, among others, Ehbrecht (1985), pp.425-6, on Germany; Fresh￿eld (1938), p.17 and
Racine (1985), p.139, on Constantinople; Ho⁄mann (1980), p.49, on Denmark; Racine (1985), pp.135-6,
on Italy; Sch￿tt (1980), pp.112-21, on Sweden.
24Gross (1890), pp.6-7.
25Gross (1890), p.43.
26Gross (1890), pp.53-4, 57.
27Lyon and Verhulst (1967), p.31.
28See Dilcher (1984), p.70; Hilton (1992), p.90; Irsigler (1985), pp.57-8; Kemble (1876), p.533; Planitz
(1940), p.21.
29Smith (1940), pp.48, 61-5, 86; Woodward (2003), pp.3-4.
11even compulsory, with members being ￿ned for missing them.30 When abroad, merchants
typically lived and interacted closely with other merchants from the same polity of origin;
for example, Italian merchants in the Byzantine Empire, the Levant and Africa obtained
￿special quarters where they could live according to their laws and beliefs￿(Lopez (1971),
p.64). Close and repeated interaction helped to generate social capital; this in turn enabled
merchant guilds to enforce the privileges granted to them by rulers, and establish collective
norms to restrict competition and secure rents.31
Enforcement of their monopoly over local trade required monitoring to detect possible
deviations - for example by alien merchants, with the possible help of some local guild
members. Thus as noted in the Introduction, alien merchants coming to trade in English
towns ￿were carefully watched, lest they should sell or buy under colour or cover of a
faithless gild-brother￿ s freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity or otherwise
severely punished, if found guilty of this o⁄ence￿(Gross, 1890, p.48). Guild members
not only sanctioned ￿ deviant￿members who breached guild rules; they also intervened
directly against non-members who undermined their monopoly over local trade. Gross
(1890), p.39, describes one such instance in detail: when Richard the Baker from Sta⁄ord
bought some wool in Newcastle-under-Lyme, local guild members seized the wool, and
then defended their action arguing that the purchase had been in breach of the guild￿ s
privileges.
Internal and external monitoring, and the resulting ability of guild members to secure
rents, were greatly facilitated by a variety of rules and restrictions. Here are just a
few examples. In tenth-century Constantinople, local guild members were required to
pool their resources and make purchases as a cartel.32 Alien merchants were not allowed
to spend more than three months in Constantinople.33 The guild of raw-silk dealers34
required its members not to ￿sell unworked silk in their homes but in the market￿ , where
mutual monitoring was easier. Members were also required not to sell to other merchants
for resale outside the city. The widespread use of staple and brokerage rights throughout
medieval Europe, described in subsection 2.2, also greatly facilitated monitoring of alien
merchants, since the latter had to bring their merchandise to a speci￿c place where it
30See Dilcher (1984), p.70; Kohn (2003), pp. 42-43; Pertz (1925), pp.118-119; Schulze (1985), pp.379-
380.
31On this see, for example, Bateson (1899), pp.205-7; Bernard (1972), p.320; Dilcher (1984), p.70;
Fresh￿eld (1938), pp.16-17, 19-22, 28-9; Irsigler (1985), pp.57-8; Planitz (1940), p.21; Racine (1985),
p.139; Schulze (1985), pp.379-80.
32Lopez and Raymond (2001), p.21-22.
33Lopez and Raymond (2001), p.21-23.
34Constantinople was unusual in having more than one local guild, but the local guilds specialized in
trading di⁄erent commodities and were not in competition with each other, which is consistent with the
model we develop below.
12could be easily inspected by local guild members, and could not trade directly with other
alien merchants or consumers.
Monitoring played a key role in enforcing compliance with guild norms both at home
and in other polities. For example, the statutes of the merchant guild of the Italian town
of Piacenza describe the duties of the consuls of the colony of merchants from Piacenza
in Genoa: these include monitoring and collecting ￿nes imposed by the merchant guild
in Piacenza.35 The same statutes also specify that in any colony where there are at least
three merchants from Piacenza, two consuls must be elected!36
Merchant guilds throughout medieval Europe employed a variety of sanctions against
members who violated guild norms, ranging from ￿nes to exclusion from the guild, con￿s-
cation of property and imprisonment.37 Exclusion typically represented a very important
punishment; for example, ￿For very serious o⁄ences the gildsmen of Andover fulminated a
decree of excommunication against the erring brother - commanding ￿ that no one receive
him, nor buy and sell with him, nor give him ￿re or water, nor hold communication with
him, under penalty of the loss of one￿ s freedom.￿ ￿(Gross, 1890, p.32).
2.5. Exclusive membership
Did local merchant guilds restrict membership? The answer is yes: membership was of-
ten contingent on having ￿citizenship￿or ￿burgess￿or ￿free￿status, from which many
were excluded.38 As towns grew, attracting large numbers of rural immigrants, this ex-
clusion a⁄ected an increasing number of urban inhabitants. In England for instance, ￿big
towns had populations most of whose members were not ￿ free￿- two thirds, for exam-
ple in late-thirteenth-century London, a half in Oxford and more than three quarters in
Exeter￿ (Hilton, 1992, p.92).
A key requirement for membership of local merchant guilds was the payment of entry
fees and a variety of dues39, which is consistent with the model we develop in Section 3.
This implied the exclusion of those who could not a⁄ord to pay the, often substantial,
35Racine (1979), p.307.
36Racine (1979), p. 307.
37See Ashtor (1983), p.415; Bateson (1899), pp.205-7; Choroskevic (1996), pp.74, 84-6; Fresh￿eld
(1938), pp. 16-7, 19-22, 28-9; Moore (1985), p.298; Racine (1985), p.139; Schulze (1985), pp.379-80;
Sch￿tt (1980), pp.112-21; Volckart and Mangels (1999), p.440.
38See Dilcher (1985), pp.88-9; Epstein (2000), pp.35-6; Leguay (2000), pp.110-1, 121-2; Schultze (1908),
475, 490-3; Sch￿tt (1980), p.131.
39For examples see Ehbrecht (1985), p.445, on entry fees for the German merchant guild of Goslar;
Dilcher (1984), p.69, and Volckart and Mangels (1999), pp.437-8, on dues levied by the Flemish merchant
guild of Tiel; Sch￿tt (1980), pp.112-21, on the dues levied by the Swedish merchant guild of Flensburg;
St￿rmer (1985), pp.366-7, on entry fees for the Austrian merchant guild of Laufen; Origo (1986), p.44,
on entry fees for the Italian merchant guild of Prato.
13entry fees, or who were unable to provide the required guarantees: ￿To become a gilds-
man...it was necessary to pay certain initiation-fees...The new comer was also required
to produce sureties, who were responsible for the ful￿lment of his obligations to the Gild
- answering for his good conduct and for the payment of his dues￿ .40 The historical
evidence makes it clear that many of the towns￿inhabitants could not meet these re-
quirements.41 Moreover, admission to local merchant guilds was sometimes controlled by
requiring that the potential new member be approved by a majority of existing members,
and this requirement appears to have been used to restrict membership.42
In sum, local merchant guilds excluded an increasing proportion of the urban popula-
tion, notably the least wealthy.
3. The baseline model
This section introduces our model. We consider a medieval polity with three types of
player: a ruler, merchants, and a tax-collector. For simplicity, they are all assumed to be
risk-neutral.43
Merchants: There is a large number N of identical individual merchants who can sell
a homogeneous good. They play an in￿nite horizon game so that in each trade period,
throughout denoted by ￿ 2 (1;::;+1), a collusive, deviation or punishment phase takes
place. The static (market) game is a reduced form of Bertrand competition: in each trade
period ￿ merchants set prices simultaneously and, given the market demand, they sell at
constant marginal costs, which are normalized to zero for simplicity. The dynamic version
of the game follows Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). In an ￿ e¢ cient￿collusive phase, that
is when all merchants charge the monopoly price, each earns a per-period pro￿t equal to
￿￿=N, while each earns 0 if not colluding, i.e., if all price at marginal cost.44 The pro￿t
that a merchant makes by deviating from an e¢ cient collusive agreement is equal to ￿￿, so
that unilateral deviations from a cartel are pro￿table in a static sense and yield a revenue
￿￿.45 The variable ￿￿ can be interpreted as a measure of the total market size. In each
period, it is determined by the realization of a random variable, e ￿
￿, which is identically
40Gross (1890), p.28.
41See Hilton (1992), p.92; Schultze (1985), pp.379-81.
42See Smith (1940), p.38.
43Introducing risk aversion would not change the basic trade-o⁄s characterized in the paper.
44As in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) we shall allow for ine¢ cient collusion: given any realization of
the market size ￿￿, merchants may set prices above marginal cost but below the monopoly level so as to
obtain any intermediate pro￿t ￿￿￿, with ￿ 2 [0;1].
45This structure is standard in the literature analyzing collusion, see for instance Chang and Harrington
(2007) and Chen and Rey (2007).
14and independently distributed over time (iid) with continuously di⁄erentiable cdf F(￿)
drawn on the compact support ￿ ￿ [￿;￿].
The ruler: The ruler governs the polity: he provides certain public goods, such as law
enforcement and defence, and ￿nances these with various sources of revenue, including
the taxation of trade. He also spends on activities that provide him with private bene￿ts,
such as military campaigns and court display.46 For our purposes it is su¢ cient to treat
his expenditures and his other sources of revenue as given exogenously, and to focus on
the revenue he can raise from the taxation of trade. The ruler is assumed to maximize this
revenue. This is a reasonable assumption for the historical period under consideration,
when rulers typically attached a low weight to the well-being of ordinary consumers.47
Bargaining power: The ruler has all the bargaining power relative to individual agents
(tax-collector, individual merchants), whose reservation utilities are normalized to zero.
On the other hand, an association of merchants could have some bargaining power. The
idea is that merchants, once organized in a guild and used to acting together in their
common interest, may acquire some bargaining power relative to the ruler, particularly in
the absence of an easy replacement. This possibility will be allowed for by assuming that
the merchant guild receives a share 1 ￿ ￿ of any ￿ surplus￿accruing from an agreement
with the ruler (￿ 6 1). We can think of 1 ￿ ￿ as a measure of the guild￿ s social capital
(cohesion and trust among the members).
Commitment: We develop our analysis under the simplifying hypothesis that the ruler
can make credible commitments. As we show, our theory provides a rationale for the
emergence of merchant guilds which does not require imperfect commitment by the ruler.
In particular, under full commitment, our objective is to disentangle in the clearest pos-
sible way the basic cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄s associated with the establishment of merchant
guilds even in the absence of any friction, such as those due to imperfect commitment,
capital constraints, etc. As will become clear below, allowing for imperfect commitment
by the ruler would entail less reliance on ex-ante fees and greater reliance on ex-post
transfers to the ruler. While this would complicate the analysis, it would not in general
make either the guild regime or the tax collector regime decisively more attractive to the
ruler.48 We therefore focus on the case of full commitment, which brings out clearly the
46For historical evidence on the importance of these, see Brewer (1989).
47The main exception would be that of essential commodities such as food, since excessively high food
prices might well provoke urban riots. Thus the model should be thought of as applying to the taxation
of other commodities.
48This is because the need for ex-post transfers would make it harder to sustain collusion in the guild
regime, by reducing each guild member￿ s expected future collusive pro￿ts; but it would also make it
15basic trade-o⁄s involved in choosing between the two regimes.
The guild regime: At time ￿ = 0, the ruler may choose to grant recognition to a
merchant guild, and endow it with privileges, notably the power to exclude individual
merchants from trade (as discussed in Section 2, this power may be applied to individuals
who are not members of the guild, and also to members who break guild rules). When
the ruler grants recognition and privileges to a merchant guild, he requires an ex ante fee,
call it R, which is shared equally among the guild￿ s members, that is, each merchant pays
R=N.49 This fee is set at the level which solves a standard Nash-bargaining game between
the ruler and the guild with weights ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿, respectively. Once it has been granted
recognition and privileges by the ruler, a guild can punish members who deviate from a
collusive agreement by excluding them from future trade. The merchants remaining in
the guild then recartelize with probability one.50 We therefore assume that when a single
merchant deviates from a collusive agreement, he is excluded from trade for the rest of
the game51 while the remaining guild members keep colluding with probability 1, as long
as this continues to be pro￿table.
The tax-collector regime: In the absence of merchant organizations, the ruler delegates
trade taxation to an agent, call it the tax-collector. In order to make the case for the
tax-collector regime as favorable as possible, we assume that the agent is not capital-
constrained. As will become clear below, this means that it is optimal for the ruler to
choose a very simple form of delegation: he endows the agent with the right to collect taxes
on trade in the polity, in return for an ex ante royalty fee ^ R.52 The agent then imposes




This tax is a function of each merchant i￿ s realized pro￿ts ^ ￿
￿
i, which in period ￿ depend
on the merchants￿actual market strategy (pricing decisions) as well as the realization of
the market size ￿￿: that is, ^ ￿
￿
i = ￿￿=N in an e¢ cient collusive phase, ^ ￿
￿
i = ￿￿ if merchant
i deviates in period ￿ given that his competitors are pricing at the monopoly level and
^ ￿
￿
i = 0 in a punishment phase. Unlike the ruler, the agent in each period can observe
harder to induce e¢ cient monitoring and surplus extraction in the tax collector regime.
49As discussed in Section 2, guild members tpically paid some entry fees, as well as a variety of other
dues. The guild then made transfers to the ruler.
50Obviously exclusion does not apply if all guild members deviate at the same time. In that case, it
seems reasonable to assume that there is no exclusion, and that members subsequently recartelize.
51Note that it will never be in the remaining members￿interest to welcome an excluded member back
into the guild.
52This is essentially ￿tax farming￿ , a very widespread practice in medieval Europe (see for example
Lyon and Verhulst, 1967, pp.33, 49; Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p.202).
53We focus on the revenue-maximizing taxes so as to make the case for the tax collector regime as
strong as possible.
16the aggregate state ￿￿ as well as each individual state ^ ￿
￿
i by paying a monitoring cost
c > 0. The key assumption here is that the ruler did not have direct access to detailed
information about these realizations. This was generally the case for medieval rulers, who
could not rely on a civil service to provide them with such information.54 Local tax-
collectors, on the other hand, had greater access to local information. For simplicity, we
capture this by assuming that they could observe the relevant information by incurring
the per-period monitoring cost c. Essentially, the idea is that the tax-collector had to
go to the market and observe trade in order to tax and collect his revenue. The cost c
may be thought of as capturing both the cost of observing trade and the cost of actually
collecting taxes.
Timing and strategies: At time ￿ = 0 the ruler decides whether to grant recognition to
a merchant guild or hire an agent as tax-collector. Accordingly, he collects the associated
royalty fees, R or ^ R. In each generic period ￿ the sequence of events is as follows: (i)
Merchants observe the ￿ public￿ 55 history of the game up to period ￿ ￿ 1, which also
includes the realization of the current state ￿￿; (ii) they post prices simultaneously; (iii)
trade takes place and taxes are levied in case an agent has been hired by the ruler. We
assume that if a deviation occurs in any period, other merchants observe the identity of
the deviating merchant by the end of the period. This assumption seems realistic in the
case of medieval polities. Indeed, most of the trading activities in that historical period
were taking place in markets where merchants could easily monitor each other￿ s pricing
strategy.56
The (static) market game is repeated an in￿nite number of periods and all agents
have a common discount factor ￿ 2 [0;1] which, as standard in the collusion literature, is
assumed to be greater than 1=2.57
A strategy for the ruler is a choice at ￿ = 0 between recognizing a guild or hiring a tax-
collector, together with an associated royalty fee. A strategy for the tax-collector instead
involves: (i) a choice as to whether to participate in the game; (ii) a monitoring decision
pro￿le fm￿ (h￿)g
+1
￿=1 with m￿ (h￿) 2 f1;0g, where, at each trade period ￿ ￿ 1 and for any
public history h￿, m￿ (h￿) = 1 if the tax-collector monitors the merchants in that period,
54Indeed, medieval rulers had to rely on a variety of agents to collect taxes, and struggled to limit the
extent to which these agents exploited their informational advantage for their own bene￿t. On this see
Bisson (1984) and Spruyt (1994).
55By public history of the game we shall mean the history observed by all the merchants, as well as by
the tax collector, if any, provided he monitors.
56Probably the most famous example is that of the Champagne fairs, but of course there were very
many other markets, including numerous local ones accommodating primarily local trade.
57As we shall explain in Section 3.2 this assumption will ensure that e¢ cient collusion is possible in
some states of the world when the ruler recognizes a merchant guild.








each period ￿ and for any public history h￿, T ￿
i (^ ￿
￿
ijh￿) maps the individual state of each
merchant i, ^ ￿
￿
i, into the set of all feasible lump-sum taxes T ￿
i (:). Essentially, a public
history pro￿le in each period ￿ includes past trades as well as past tax rates. A strategy
for each merchant i speci￿es a per-period decision on whether to trade and a pricing
behavior, both contingent on past history and the current state of nature. Moreover, we
shall assume that whenever expected pro￿ts from collusion are at least equal to expected
pro￿ts from deviating, merchants will prefer to collude.58
We shall look for the (pure strategy) subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this
game.
Technical assumptions: For expositional simplicity, in the rest of the analysis we will
make the following assumptions:
(A1) All agents in the polity are capital unconstrained.
A1 guarantees that our results do not rely on binding capital constraints neither on
the tax-collector nor on the guild￿ s side.
(A2) The monitoring cost c is lower than the expectation of the market value E[￿], that
is c < E[￿].
This assumption implies that if the tax-collector expects merchants to collude, he will
always ￿nd it optimal to monitor. This renders the tax-collector regime non-trivial.
Let n ￿ N be the guild￿ s size, i.e., the number of its active members,
(A3) A guild requires a minimum number of active members to be pro￿table, that is n ￿ n,
with n < N and inf fng = 2:
A3 rules out the unrealistic and uninteresting possibility of a ￿ single member￿guild.
This assumption is motivated by the historical evidence, and it captures, in the simplest
possible way for our purposes, the idea that guilds with smaller density (fewer members)
were more likely to be exposed to competition by excluded merchants since their ability
to monitor trading activities taking place outside the ￿ regular￿market, i.e., that o¢ cially
permitted by the ruler, decreased with the number of active members. Indeed, preventing
uno¢ cial trade required a minimal amount of monitoring e⁄ort, whose cost was generally
shared by the guild members. Thus we are assuming that the cost per member was
58This is the standard assumption in the collusion literature and avoids cumbersome notation.
18su¢ ciently small to be normalized to zero as long as the number of members did not
fall below n. In the following analysis we shall interpret the guild￿ s density n as being a
measure of the guild￿ s monitoring ability, that is, the larger is the lower-bound n, the less
e¢ cient is the guild￿ s monitoring ￿technology￿ .
Social capital: To summarize, the guild￿ s social capital is captured in two ways in the
baseline model. First, we assume that greater cohesion and trust among guild members
makes it easier for them to overcome free-riding incentives and coordinate on e¢ cient
monitoring. This reduces n, the minimum number of members needed to detect attempts
by non-members to undermine the guild￿ s monopoly over local trade (by engaging in
uno¢ cial and forbidden trading activities). One way in which this reduction was achieved
in practice, as discussed in Section 2, was through agreement on guild rules that simply
made monitoring easier - e.g. by requiring alien merchants to bring their merchandise to
a speci￿c place, and trade only through intermediaries who were themselves members of
the local merchant guild.
Second, we assume that greater cohesion and trust among guild members increases
their bargaining power relative to the ruler; i.e. it reduces ￿.
4. Trade, taxation and collusion with a single guild
We begin by considering what the ruler can achieve when merchants are not organized in
a guild, then proceed to examine the role of guilds.
4.1. Trade and taxation in the absence of merchant guilds
In the absence of merchant organizations, the ruler hires an agent who can observe in each
period ￿ the realized market value ￿￿ as well as the individual pro￿t ^ ￿
￿
i of each merchant
upon paying the per-period monitoring cost c.59 In this case, the agent is given the power
to impose and collect a lump-sum tax T ￿
i (^ ￿
￿
i) contingent on every merchant i￿ s realized
pro￿t. That is, at the end of each trade period ￿, this agent collects T ￿
i (^ ￿i) from each












where, as described before, the variable ^ ￿
￿
i represents the actual pro￿t of merchant i
in period ￿ and it changes depending on whether the trade market is in a collusive,
59As noted in Section 3, the cost c may be thought of as capturing both the cost of observing trade and
the cost of collecting contingent taxes from merchants. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that if
the ruler hired a merchant to collect taxes, this merchant would not be able to engage in trade at the
same time; thus the cost c would still need to be incurred.
19punishment or deviation phase.60 We solve the model backward by analyzing the subgame
between the merchants and the tax-collector assuming that this agent has been hired by
the ruler.
Given our assumptions, there exists a class of simple and intuitive SPNE of this
game where the tax-collector always monitors and sets a zero-pro￿t tax rate which leaves
merchants with no surplus in each trade period ￿, that is T ￿
i (^ ￿
￿
i) = ^ ￿
￿
i for each i and ￿,
while merchants collude at a price which guarantees an expected pro￿t at least equal to c in
each period.61 Indeed, since we have assumed that whenever indi⁄erent between colluding
and deviating merchants will collude, it immediately follows that this type of equilibria
exist, and collusion is self-enforcing for every number of active merchants, N, and for any
possible discount factor, ￿. The reason is that taxation reduces the merchants￿post-tax
pro￿ts to zero when they deviate as well as when they collude, thereby eliminating any
incentive to deviate. In order to make the case for the tax-collector regime as strong as
possible, in what follows we focus on the equilibrium where collusion is fully e¢ cient and
the tax collector extracts the maximum surplus from trade.62
Proposition 1: When the ruler hires a tax-collector there exists a SPNE of the game
between merchants and the tax-collector where: collusion is always e¢ cient and, in each
period, the equilibrium tax rate is T ￿
i (^ ￿
￿
i) = ￿￿=N, which leaves merchants with no surplus.
Moreover, the tax-collector￿ s ex ante participation constraint binds,
^ U (￿;c) =
E[￿] ￿ c
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ^ R = 0 8 (￿;c):
and the ruler obtains a pro￿t equal to




Clearly, the incentive for the ruler to hire the tax-collector increases the larger is the
di⁄erence between the expected market size and the monitoring cost, and the larger is
the discount factor.
60Although merchants are assumed to be capital unconstrained, the tax-collector can never extract
more than ^ ￿
￿
i at the market stage. Indeed, a merchant would have no incentive to bring his total wealth
to the market, knowing that in this case the tax T￿
i (^ ￿
￿
i ) could exceed his market revenue ^ ￿
￿
i .
61When N is small there may exist other SPNE of the game between merchants and the tax-collector,
in which the tax-collector never monitors and merchants collude by setting a price such that total pro￿ts
are equal to c ￿ ", with " small enough. Clearly, in this case, there is no scope for hiring a tax-collector,
thereby making the ruler￿ s decision at ￿ = 0 trivial. We therefore abstract from such equilibria in the
remainder of the paper.
62We therefore also abstract from any possible equilibria in which collusion is fully e¢ cient but the tax
collector only extracts part of the surplus from trade.
204.2. Merchant guilds: trade, taxation and privileges
A possible alternative for the ruler, enabling him to achieve a higher pro￿t, is the following.
A subset of merchants organize themselves as a group, able to act in the group members￿
collective interest: Call this group ￿ the guild￿ . The ruler grants privileges to the guild,
and in particular monopoly power over trade - that is, only members of the guild are
authorized to trade. Under what conditions can the guild implement a better outcome
than the tax collector, from the ruler￿ s point of view?
To answer this question, we begin by characterizing the incentives of individual guild
members and their implications for collusion. Let n ￿ N be the subset of active merchants
belonging to the guild. For any given realization of the market size ￿ 2 ￿ in period ￿, a
merchant who charges the monopoly price, given that the other members of the guild do














i (￿) = ￿: (4.2)
Where ￿ is the spot gain from an individual deviation by merchant i in period ￿ given
that the other n￿1 members of the guild are behaving collusively, while the continuation
payo⁄ following a deviation is equal to zero since the merchant will be excluded from the
market starting from the next period ￿ + 1.




(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (4.3)
As might be expected, it is more di¢ cult to sustain collusion when the guild￿ s size
(number of members) increases. Intuitively, the greater the number of merchants in the
guild, the lower is the individual gain that each merchant can appropriate from collusion.
Conversely, holding guild size constant, collusion is easier to implement the larger is the
expectation of market value.
For su¢ ciently large realizations of ￿, it may not be possible to sustain e¢ cient collu-
sion, as the potential gain from deviation would be too high. In such cases, collusion will
entail setting a price below the monopoly price, which makes the potential gain from de-
viation smaller. It seems reasonable, given that we are considering the incentives of guild
members, to focus on equilibria in which the price is set at the highest level compatible
21with sustaining collusion. Speci￿cally, there may exist a threshold ￿￿ 2 ￿, with ￿￿ < ￿,
such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿￿ each merchant obtains a pro￿t ￿=n from being in an e¢ cient
collusive phase, while for ￿ > ￿￿ the maximal pro￿t that a guild member can obtain is




(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
; (4.4)




￿dF(￿) + (1 ￿ F(￿
￿))￿
￿: (4.5)
Thus, when the market value is high, the guild will obtain a collective pro￿t, ￿￿, which
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To pursue the analysis, we now specialize our model and impose the following simpli-
fying assumption:
(A4) The distribution of the market size is uniform and is drawn from the unit interval
￿ ￿ [0;1], that is e ￿
￿ ￿U[0;1].
A4 is made only for ease of computation and to work with tractable closed-form
solutions. All our qualitative results can be generalized to the case of any generic cdf
F(￿) which satis￿es standard regularity conditions. Under this speci￿cation, it is easy to
show that the cut-o⁄ value ￿￿ depends only on ￿ and n, and is equal to:
￿
￿ (￿;n) =
2(1 ￿ n(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
:
This cut-o⁄ value is obviously increasing in ￿, since more patient merchants are less
attracted by deviations. Moreover, the larger is the size of the guild, i.e., the larger is n,
the lower is ￿￿ (:),since each merchant is tempted to deviate more often in an environment
where the gain from collusion has to be shared among many. Thus to have ￿￿ (:) as large
as possible, the guild cannot have too many members. In particular, it will never be
63The case where ￿￿ < ￿ corresponds to instances where in order to support collusion in states higher
than ￿￿ merchants must charge prices lower than the monopoly one. Formally, this implies that the guild
total pro￿t in each of these states is ￿￿ with ￿ = ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿.
22pro￿table to have a guild when its size exceeds the maximum threshold level compatible
with sustaining collusion in at least some state. This upper bound on the number of guild
members is obtained by setting ￿￿ (￿;n) = 0, and is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The guild regime has the following key features:
(i) For a guild to be pro￿table, its size (number of members) must be lower than an
upper bound n(￿), given by:




(ii) A guild can be recognized if and only if ￿ > 1=2 and n < n(￿).
Thus if N ￿ n(￿) guild membership will be restricted: there will be some exclusion.
Clearly the upper-bound on the number of guild members is higher when merchants are
more patient, i.e., the higher is ￿. The need for the upper-bound n(￿), together with
the minimum size requirement imposed in A3, leads to a necessary condition for a guild
to represent a potentially valuable option for the ruler which is provided in part (ii).
Intuitively, the ruler may have an interest in granting recognition to a merchant guild
only when its members are su¢ ciently patient and able to protect their trading ￿ territory￿
from excluded local or alien merchants.





denote the value of n which solves ￿￿ (￿;n) = 1 (i.e., the highest number of guild members
compatible with sustaining e¢ cient collusion), we can establish the following result.
Proposition 2: Whenever a guild is recognized the following properties hold:
(i) if ￿ ￿ 2=3 and n ￿ n￿ (￿); collusion is fully e¢ cient in all states ￿ 2 ￿: In this
case, the optimal guild size is such that n ￿ n ￿ n￿ (￿); and each merchant obtains
a pro￿t ￿￿=n in every period ￿.
(ii) if n > n￿ (￿), collusion cannot be fully e¢ cient in all states ￿ 2 ￿. In this case, the
optimal guild size is equal to n: In any period ￿ where ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ each guild member
obtains ￿￿=n; while in any period ￿ where ￿￿ > ￿￿ each gets ￿￿=n.
23Intuitively, collusion can be e¢ cient in every state only if the discount factor is large
enough and merchants￿monitoring ability is su¢ ciently e⁄ective. Otherwise, e¢ cient
collusion cannot be enforced in all states even when the guild￿ s size is reduced to its
lower bound, n = n. In this case the guild will not be able to extract all the potential
surplus from trade. The ruler may then face a trade-o⁄ between hiring a tax-collector
and granting recognition to a merchant guild. This trade-o⁄ will be explored in the next
section.
4.3. Merchant guild versus tax-collector
We can now study the conditions under which recognizing a merchant guild is optimal
for the ruler. Of course, when recognizing a guild and granting it a monopoly over local
trade ensures e¢ cient collusion in all possible states, the ruler will prefer not to hire the
tax-collector, unless his monitoring cost is zero. When instead collusion cannot be fully
e¢ cient under the guild regime, that is if ￿￿ (￿;n) < 1, the ruler faces an interesting
trade-o⁄. On the one hand, hiring a tax-collector ensures e¢ cient collusion in all states,
irrespective of the discount factor and the number of active merchants on the market.
On the other hand, the tax-collector￿ s monitoring activity is costly and thus there are
limits to the surplus that the ruler can extract from this simple form of delegation. The
trade-o⁄ between these two e⁄ects shapes the ruler￿ s optimal choice and is analyzed in
the next proposition:
Proposition 3: If ￿ ￿ 1=2 or n ￿ n(￿) the ruler￿ s best strategy is to hire a tax-
collector. When ￿ > 1=2 and n < n(￿); the ruler￿ s choice between granting recognition
to a merchant guild or hiring a tax-collector is determined as follows:
(i) If ￿ ￿ 2=3 and n ￿ n￿ (￿) the ruler always prefers to recognize a guild rather than
hiring a tax-collector.
(ii) If n > n￿ (￿) there exists a positive function c￿ (￿;n) such that the ruler prefers to
recognize a guild rather than hire a tax-collector whenever c ￿ c￿ (￿;n), while the
converse holds otherwise. Moreover, in the relevant range of parameters, c￿ (￿;n) is
increasing in n and decreasing in ￿.
This result has a simple and immediate economic intuition. Of course, the ruler
is unable to grant recognition to a guild if its ability to keep excluded merchants out
of the market is su¢ ciently poor. Conversely, when the guild is endowed with a strong
monitoring ability, the ruler always prefers to deal with an association of merchants instead
24of hiring a tax-collector, as long as the merchants are su¢ ciently patient to sustain e¢ cient
collusion in every state of nature. Finally, when a guild cannot ensure e¢ cient collusion
in all states of nature, the ruler may still prefer the guild regime to hiring a tax-collector.
This will be the case if the tax collector￿ s monitoring cost is above a given threshold,
which depends positively on the discount factor and negatively on the minimum guild
size.
Clearly, the guild￿ s monitoring ability plays a crucial role in the trade-o⁄ between the
guild regime and the tax-collector regime. This monitoring ability will depend on several
factors, including the geographical and population characteristics of the polity, which
may make it easier or harder to detect alien or excluded local merchants who engage in
unauthorized trade, as well as the polity￿ s openness to foreigners, and its attractiveness
to alien merchants. Monitoring ability will also depend, on the other hand, on the degree
of trust and cohesion among guild members, and the extent to which they are able to
overcome free-riding incentives and cooperate to monitor e⁄ectively - in other words, on
their social capital. In this sense, the guild members￿social capital is valuable not just
for them, but also for the ruler.
5. Trade, taxation and collusion with multiple guilds
We now extend the previous analysis to the case where the ruler has the option of granting
recognition and privileges to more than one guild. To be consistent with the earlier
analysis, and thereby bring out clearly the implications of recognizing more than one guild,
we continue to assume that the ruler has full commitment power and that merchants are
capital unconstrained. For simplicity, we shall focus on the case where the ruler chooses
between recognizing one or two guilds. As we shall see, this is su¢ cient to identify all the
trade-o⁄s we are interested in.64
Consider a polity where I = 2N merchants are potentially active and can sell a
homogenous good. Each merchant belongs to one of two symmetric65 groups ( j = 1;2),
of size Nj = N .66 A natural interpretation for the two groups, discussed below, would
be local and alien merchants, or alien merchants from two di⁄erent polities of origin.
Merchants belonging to both groups compete in the same market by setting prices and
64The analysis can be easily adapted to study the case of M > 2 guilds.
65Symmetry is assumed only for expositional simplicity.
66As will become clear in the remainder of the analysis, allowing for asymmetric groups (i.e., with
di⁄erent sizes) would not bring additional insights, since the individual incentive constraint that needs
to be satis￿ed for collusion to be an equilibrium of the market game with multiple guilds depends only
on the total number of merchants active in both guilds.
25both the static and the dynamic games are modeled as in Section 4.67 In each period ￿
the market size is captured once again by the realization of a random variable e ￿
￿ ￿U[0;1]
which is iid over time.
To study the ruler￿ s choice between recognizing one or two guilds, we assume that in
each of the two groups, a subset of merchants organize themselves as a subgroup, able to
act in its members￿common interest: i.e., a "guild". A ￿rst natural question one may
want to ask is how the presence of two guilds modi￿es the bargaining game between ruler
and merchants. The answer seems intuitive: if the ruler only needs to recognize one guild
in order to maximize his revenue from trade, the presence of two potential candidates
allows him to gain bargaining power by playing the two competing organizations one
against the other. A simple way of modeling this is to assume that the ruler gains full
bargaining power vis-￿-vis each guild (whose reservation value is zero). This would be the
case, for example, if recognition and privileges were assigned through an auction, forcing
each guild to bid competitively. This will be our benchmark for the single-guild case.
Clearly, the ruler will only grant recognition to both guilds if this entails some (net)
bene￿t relative to the single-guild case. Our analysis so far suggests a very likely potential
advantage of granting recognition and privileges to both guilds: this may induce more
e¢ cient monitoring, and thereby relax the minimum size requirement for each guild. For
example, a guild of local merchants is likely to have better access to information about
possible unauthorized trading activities by excluded local merchants, while a guild of alien
merchants from a particular polity of origin will be more easily informed about any trading
activities by other citizens of that polity (who are not members of the guild). To capture
this as simply as possible, we assume that when both guilds are recognized, the minimum
size of each is reduced by a fraction ￿, that is, nj = ￿n. The parameter ￿ ￿ 1=2 captures
the extent to which having the two guilds, rather than just one, increases monitoring
e¢ ciency: when ￿ < 1=2, multiple guilds generate ￿ economies of scale￿in monitoring68,
and these scale economies are greater for lower values of ￿.
Intuitively, while multiple guilds may increase monitoring e¢ ciency, they may also
make it harder to sustain collusion. To investigate the interaction between these two
e⁄ects, and the resulting trade-o⁄between recognizing one or two guilds, we start by ana-
lyzing the collective behavior of the two guilds, as well as the behavior of their individual
members.
67Obviously, it would be easy to provide a rationale for multiple guilds if we assumed that di⁄erent
groups sold di⁄erent goods and were active in di⁄erent markets. We abstract from this possibility to
focus on the more interesting trade-o⁄ between one and two guilds when merchants sell the same good
and are active in the same market.
68These are "economies of scale" in the sense that more guilds make it possible to achieve the required
level of monitoring with a smaller total number of merchants.
26We retain the same assumptions as in the earlier analysis concerning behavior within
each guild: in particular, an individual guild member who deviates from guild norms (e.g.
by setting a lower price and thereby "stealing" trade from other guild members) will be
punished by exclusion.69 The main di⁄erence relative to the single-guild case concerns
collusion between guilds. Here we assume that if the members of one guild collectively
deviate from a collusive agreement with the other guild, collusion may be restored with
probability ￿ 2 [0;1], after a period of punishment where each active merchant gets zero
pro￿ts. This assumption di⁄ers from the assumption of in￿nite punishments in Rotem-
berg and Saloner (1986); however, as they argue, ￿such in￿nite-length punishments are
unlikely to be carried out in practice￿ . Indeed, two of the reasons they give for consid-
ering in￿nite punishments unrealistic in the case of oligopoly seem to apply with at least
equal force to the case of merchant guilds: ￿rst, ￿once the punishment period has begun,
the oligopoly would prefer to return to a more collusive arrangement￿ . Second, ￿one can
think the reason why ￿rms succeed in punishing each other at all (even though punish-
ments are costly) is because of the anger generated when a rival cheats on the implicit
agreement. This anger, as any ￿ irritational￿emotion, may be short-lived￿ . Moreover, one
important factor hindering collusion in an oligopoly setting is of course the possibility of
being caught breaking the law, and the constraints this places on ￿rms￿ability to com-
municate e⁄ectively and trust each other. Merchant guilds, in contrast, would not have
had to worry about any such sanctions and constraints imposed by rulers.70 We therefore
follow Chang and Harrington (2007) in assuming that ￿ recartelization￿occurs with some
probability. The parameter ￿ is meant to capture cultural, social and ethnic di⁄erences
between merchants belonging to di⁄erent groups. The idea is that greater heterogeneity
between the two groups will entail a lower probability of recartelization ￿. Essentially,
sharper di⁄erences in cultural, ethnic and social characteristics make it harder for the two
groups to communicate e⁄ectively and trust one another again once a collusive agreement
has been broken by one group￿ s collective deviation, hampering future recartelization.71
In line with the earlier analysis, we rule out the unrealistic and uninteresting case of
￿ single member￿guilds by assuming:
69Clearly, a merchant who undercuts his fellow guild members and is expelled from his guild will not
be welcomed in the other guild.
70In our model, the ruler will be simply indi⁄erent about collusion among merchant guilds, once the
ex-ante fees have been paid. If we introduced capital constraints and/or imperfect commitment, implying
the need for ex-post transfers from the guilds to the ruler, recartelization after a deviation would be in
the ruler￿ s interest; this would make the case for allowing recartelization, with some probability, even
stronger.
71There is substantial evidence showing that ethnic diversity can make it harder to achieve trust and
cooperation; see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for an excellent survey.
27(A5) ￿n ￿ 2 (implying that inf fng = 4, to ensure consistency between the two condi-
tions, ￿n ￿ 2 and ￿ ￿ 1=2).
Finally, we also assume that the ruler cannot create a single ￿ mixed￿guild, i.e., an
association of merchants consisting of members of both groups. There are two main
reasons for this. First, substantial heterogeneity within a guild would make it harder to
generate the required cohesion and trust among its members (social capital). Second,
suppose the ruler of a given polity could establish a guild of local and alien merchants.
Individual deviations from guild norms would then be punished by exclusion from this
guild. However, this might be a rather weak punishment for alien merchants, who could
always continue to trade in other polities, and back home. In contrast, if alien merchants
from any given polity belonged to a foreign ￿ branch￿of the local merchant guild in their
polity of origin, exclusion would be a much more serious punishment, since it would apply
both at home and abroad. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2, such foreign branches of
local merchant guilds were common ￿mixed guilds were not.
5.1. Individual versus collective incentive constraints
We can now study individual and group behavior when two guilds are granted recognition
and privileges. In this case, two types of incentive constraint must be satis￿ed for collusion
to be feasible. First, collusion needs to be incentive compatible from each individual￿ s
point of view: that is, given that the two guilds decide to cartelize, none of their members
should ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate from such a ￿ group￿strategy. It is straightforward to
check that this individual incentive constraint is the same as in the case of a single guild
analyzed above and is given by:
￿ ￿
￿E[￿]
(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
; (5.1)
where n = n1 + n2 now de￿nes the total number of merchants active in the market and
belonging to both groups, with n1 = n2 = n=2 because of symmetry. As before, this
constraint implies that collusion can be enforced if the total number of active merchants
is not too large, if merchants are patient enough, and if expected market pro￿tability is
su¢ ciently high.
However, we must now also make sure that both guilds ￿nd it pro￿table to collude:
i.e., that collective deviations (at the guild level) are not pro￿table. Since we have as-
sumed that following a collective deviation the two guilds recartelize with an exogenous











The left-hand-side of this inequality captures the (intertemporal) collective gain that
each subgroup of merchants can obtain from a collusive agreement when two guilds are
endowed with privileges. Its right-hand-side measures the gain from a collective deviation:
the ￿rst term is the guild￿ s spot gain from a deviation today, while the second term repre-
sents the expected gains from future recartelization, which materializes with probability
￿ one period after the punishment phase. Rewriting the condition as:




makes it easy to see that the collective incentive constraint becomes tighter the larger
is the probability of recartelization ￿: if future recartelization is more likely, collective
deviations become more attractive. Note that since this condition does not depend on
the number of active merchants, only the discount factor ￿ a⁄ects simultaneously (5.1)
and (5.3).
The analysis proceeds along similar lines to the one-guild case of Section 4. If neither
incentive constraint binds, e¢ cient collusion is feasible. When one of the two constraints
binds, collusion can only be sustained if merchants price below the monopoly level. In
particular, the incentive constraints (5.1) and (5.2) yield two thresholds, call them ￿￿ and
b ￿ respectively, such that for all states of nature satisfying ￿ > minf￿￿;b ￿g, merchants
price below the monopoly level, and each guild gains a total pro￿t ￿j = minf￿￿;b ￿g=2.
On the other hand, collusion is fully e¢ cient for all ￿ < minf￿￿;b ￿g: In these states the
two guilds obtain a pro￿t equal to ￿j = ￿=2.
Two cases must then be distinguished. First, if minf￿￿;b ￿g = ￿￿, the analysis follows




2(1 ￿ n(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
:




￿dF(￿) + (1 ￿ F(b ￿))b ￿;
29where, for any pair (￿;￿) 2 [0;1]
2, the cut-o⁄ b ￿ solves:
b ￿ (￿;￿) =




￿dF(￿) + (1 ￿ F(b ￿))b ￿
￿
:
Using the uniform speci￿cation over the unit support, simple integration yields:
b ￿ (￿;￿) =
2(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)
:
Which of these cut-o⁄values is lower depends on the discount factor, the total number
of guild members, and the probability of recartelization. Note ￿rst that since ￿￿ (￿;n) is
decreasing in n, an exclusion result similar to the one illustrated in Lemma 1 obtains:
Lemma 2: If privileges are recognized to both subgroups of merchants, there is an upper







8 j = 1;2:
As before, in order to sustain collusion, the size of each guild cannot be too large.
At the same time, it cannot be too small, because of the need to monitor e⁄ectively
and prevent unauthorized trade (and in particular, prevent excluded merchants from
undercutting guild members). In addition, we now have a collective incentive constraint









be the value of n which solves 2￿n = n(￿), respectively. Moreover, denote by ￿
￿ (￿) the
discount factor solving n(￿;￿) = inf fng. The following result provides the necessary
conditions for the ruler to be able to grant recognition to both subgroups of merchants.
Lemma 3: The ruler will consider recognizing two guilds if, and only if, merchants are
su¢ ciently patient, ￿ ￿ maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g, the probability of recartelization is not too large,
￿ < ￿(￿), and the merchants￿monitoring technology is not too ine¢ cient, n < n(￿;￿).
This result provides necessary conditions for two guilds to be a viable option for the
30ruler. It captures the simple economic intuitions discussed above. First, for a ruler to
￿nd it worthwhile to grant recognition to both subgroups of merchants these must be
su¢ ciently patient; moreover, their ability to prevent excluded merchants from trading
and undercutting the cartel must be su¢ ciently e⁄ective, that is n < n(￿;￿). Finally, the
probability of recartelization must be su¢ ciently small, so that collective deviations are
not too attractive, ￿ < ￿(￿). The idea here is that if guilds anticipate that the likelihood
of recartelization is su¢ ciently large in any subgame following a collective deviation, the
temptation to break the cartel will be so strong as to make it impossible to construct
equilibria where collusion can be sustained.
Note that for ￿ ￿ 1=2 one has n(￿;￿) ￿ n(￿), with equality only at ￿ = 1=2.
Therefore, since n(￿;￿) is decreasing in ￿, when ￿ < 1=2 there will be cases in which
recognizing a single guild is not feasible, while it is possible to recognize both.











denote the value of ￿ such that b ￿ (￿;￿) = 1. Moreover, let ￿
￿￿ (￿) be the value of ￿ such
that n￿￿ (￿;￿) = inf fng. We have:
Proposition 4: Granting recognition and privileges to both subgroups of merchants
makes it possible to sustain e¢ cient collusion in all states of nature if, and only if,
￿ ￿ maxf￿
￿￿ (￿);2=3g, n ￿ n￿￿ (￿;￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (￿).
The intuition underlying this result is similar to that provided for Proposition 2, with
the additional requirement that in the case of multiple guilds the collective incentive
constraint must also be satis￿ed in all states of nature (for collusion to be fully e¢ cient).
In particular, granting recognition to both subgroups of merchants allows the two guilds to
jointly implement monopoly pro￿ts in the region of parameters where both the individual
and collective incentive constraints are satis￿ed in all states of nature. This is true when:
(i) the discount factor is large enough so as to satisfy both constraints (5.1) and (5.2);
(ii) the probability of recartelization is su¢ ciently small so as make collective deviations
unattractive; and (iii) the guilds￿ability to prevent excluded merchants from undercutting
the cartel is su¢ ciently high.
31This clearly illustrates the key potential cost and bene￿t of recognizing two guilds
instead of one, when it comes to implementing e¢ cient collusion: the cost is that fully
e¢ cient collusion may be harder to sustain - in particular, we have an additional condition
that has to be satis￿ed, ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (￿). When the probability of recartelization is too high,
e¢ cient collusion is not feasible with two guilds, whereas it may be feasible with a single
guild. When the probability of recartelization is not too large, on the other hand, e¢ cient
collusion may be feasible with two guilds but not with one. The reason is that, in the
presence of economies of scale in monitoring, it may be possible to satisfy the minimum
size constraints when two guilds are recognized but not when only one guild is recognized:
for ￿ < 1=2, n￿￿ (￿;￿) > n￿ (￿). This trade-o⁄will be important in determining the ruler￿ s
optimal strategy; in addition, we will need to take into account what happens when fully
e¢ cient collusion is not feasible - but some collusion can nevertheless be sustained. We
do this in the following section.
5.2. The ruler￿ s optimal strategy with multiple guilds
The previous section described the individual and collective incentive constraints that
need to be satis￿ed for collusion to be enforceable when two guilds are recognized. We
can now turn to the ruler￿ s optimization program for this case. Let
Wj (￿;n;￿) =
R minfb ￿(:);￿￿(:)g




be guild j￿ s expected intertemporal pro￿t, and denote by Uj (￿;n;￿;Rj) = Wj (￿;n;￿)￿Rj
its ex ante utility net of the royalty fee. Our objective in this section is to study the trade-
o⁄ between recognizing one or two guilds due to factors other than bargaining power. In
particular, it may be that if there are only two guilds and the ruler wants to recognize
both, the guilds have some bargaining power: the ruler cannot simply force them to bid
competitively in an auction (as in the single-guild case). However, we are only considering
the case with two (as opposed to multiple) guilds for simplicity, and if, for example, we
had three guilds and the ruler could take full advantage of possible economies of scale
in monitoring by recognizing just two guilds, an auction with competitive bidding would
again be feasible. Thus it seems reasonable, and more interesting, to abstract from ad
hoc di⁄erences in bargaining power and assume that the ruler has full bargaining power
in both cases. In the case where he recognizes two guilds, the ruler will then choose Rj











Uj (￿;n;￿;Rj) ￿ 0 8 j 2 f1;2g:
In a symmetric equilibrium the ruler￿ s optimal (total) transfer, which de￿nes his pro￿t,
is given by:
V
￿￿ (￿;n;￿) = 2R
￿￿ (￿;n;￿) = 2W (￿;n;￿):
Since the ruler extracts all the surplus from both guilds, his pro￿t is equal to the total
market surplus.
We can now study the ruler￿ s optimal strategy. To make the exposition easier to
follow, it is useful to distinguish and study in turn three parameter regions.
5.2.1. Tax collector
First, it is immediate to see that when ￿ is su¢ ciently small or n is very large the only
feasible action for the ruler is to hire a tax-collector. In this parameter region, it is not
possible to satisfy the minimum size requirements and sustain collusion, whether one
guild is recognized (Lemma 1) or two guilds (Proposition 3):
Proposition 5: If ￿ < maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g or n ￿ n(￿;￿) the ruler can only hire a tax-
collector.
5.2.2. Tax collector or two guilds?
The second case obtains when n 2 ￿(￿;￿) = [n(￿);n(￿;￿)). In this parameter region,
the ruler￿ s action space includes two options: hiring a tax-collector or granting recognition
to both guilds. In particular, as observed before, when ￿ < 1=2 the upper-bound on a
single guild size, n(￿), is lower than that required when two guilds are recognized, n(￿;￿),
so that the interval ￿(￿;￿) is non-empty. As a consequence, for all n 2 ￿(￿;￿) it is not
possible to sustain collusion with one guild, whereas collusion can be sustained if both
guilds are granted recognition and privileges. The ruler￿ s best action is to recognize two
guilds if
2W (￿;n;￿) ￿ ^ V (￿;c);
while a tax-collector will be hired otherwise. The choice will therefore depend on the
discount factor ￿, the tax-collector￿ s monitoring cost c, the probability of recartelization ￿
33and the guild￿ s minimum size requirement ￿n. Of course, if the probability of recarteliza-
tion is too large, i.e., if ￿ > ￿(￿), collusion can never be e¢ cient with two guilds and hence
the ruler￿ s optimal choice is to hire a tax-collector. If ￿ < ￿(￿), on the other hand, the
ruler will recognize the two guilds when the tax-collector￿ s monitoring technology is not
su¢ ciently e⁄ective, that is, c is relatively large. Otherwise, he will hire a tax collector.
The result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6: Assume ￿ < 1=2, ￿ ￿ maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g and ￿ < ￿(￿), then for all n 2
￿(￿;￿) there exists a positive function c￿￿ (￿;n;￿;￿) such that if c ￿ c￿￿ (￿;n;￿;￿) granting
recognition to both guilds is optimal for the ruler. A tax-collector is hired otherwise.
This result is similar in spirit to Proposition 3. The di⁄erence is that now the ruler
may face a trade-o⁄between hiring a tax-collector and granting recognition to two guilds
(rather than one as in the earlier analysis). As already pointed out, hiring a tax-collector
delivers e¢ cient collusion, but at a price, because of the agent￿ s cost of monitoring trade.
When two guilds are granted recognition, on the other hand, there are no monitoring costs
but collusion is not necessarily e¢ cient because of the interplay between the individual
and the collective incentive constraints (5.1)-(5.3). As a consequence, the ruler will prefer
to grant recognition to both guilds when the tax-collector￿ s monitoring cost is higher than
the loss of pro￿ts due to ine¢ cient collusion.
5.2.3. One guild, two guilds or tax collector?
Finally, perhaps the most interesting case occurs when n < n(￿). In this parameter
region, the ruler￿ s action set is the largest possible and it includes the option of granting
privileges to a single guild or to both, as well as the possibility of delegating taxation
to an agent. This is a natural case to study if one is interested in describing the basic
trade-o⁄s faced by a ruler who can decide whether to grant recognition only to a local
guild or to accommodate also foreign merchants organized as an independent association.
Leaving aside the option of hiring a tax-collector, the relevant trade-o⁄ is the following:
granting recognition to a single guild is better for the purpose of enhancing collusion, as
in this case there is no collective incentive constraint to satisfy, which is instead a key
requirement when recognition is extended to multiple guilds. However, in the presence of
scale economies in monitoring (i.e., when ￿ < 1=2), granting recognition to two guilds may
enable the ruler to relax the individual incentive constraint, relative to the case in which
the single-guild regime entails minimum size. The ruler will then choose to recognize two
guilds if:
2W (￿;n;￿) ￿ max
j2f1;2g
n
^ V (￿;c);W (￿;nj)
o
;
34where W (￿;nj) is the surplus he would obtain when dealing only with guild j. The next
proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 7: Assume ￿ > maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g: Then, the following properties are satis-
￿ed:
(i) The ruler weakly prefers to recognize one guild instead of two if one of the following
conditions hold: ￿ = 1=2; n < n￿ (￿), or ￿ > ￿(￿). In this parameter region his
choice will be as described in Proposition 3.
(ii) Assume ￿ < 1=2 and n 2 [n￿ (￿);n(￿)): Then, if c ￿ c￿ (￿;n) there exists a function
b ￿(￿;n;￿) < ￿(￿) such that for all ￿ ￿ b ￿(￿;n;￿) the ruler prefers to recognize both
guilds. Otherwise he prefers to have a single guild.
(iii) Assume ￿ < 1=2 and n 2 [n￿ (￿);n(￿)): Then, if c < c￿ (￿;n) the same qualitative
results as in Proposition 6 obtain; that is, the ruler prefers to recognize two guilds
only if c is su¢ ciently large. Otherwise he hires a tax-collector.
The intuition for this result is simple. Clearly, the ruler prefers to recognize a single
guild, rather than multiple guilds, in the following cases: (a) if having two guilds does not
bring any e¢ ciency gain in monitoring; (b) if merchants￿monitoring ability is su¢ cient
to deliver e¢ cient collusion with a single guild; (c) if the probability of recartelization is
so large that e¢ cient collusion cannot be sustained with multiple guilds. The trade-o⁄
between a single guild and a tax collector is then the same as in the earlier analysis.
On the other hand, when the single-guild regime generates ine¢ cient collusion because
the minimum size constraint is binding, recognizing two guilds may increase e¢ ciency (of
collusion), as long as there are economies of scale in monitoring, and the probability of
recartelization is not too high. The trade-o⁄ between two guilds and a tax collector is
then the same as in Proposition 6.
6. Merchant guilds: theory and evidence
In this section we review the main implications of our theory and relate them to the
available historical evidence. To begin with, the theoretical analysis developed in Section
4 is able to account for the emergence of merchant guilds as a mechanism to sustain collu-
sion among merchants, and between merchants and rulers, bypassing the need for costly
monitoring by other parties hired as tax-collectors. In doing so, the model also provides
a rationale for the observed privileges granted by rulers to merchant guilds (notably the
35right to exclude non-members from trade, as well as members who have deviated from
guild rules), the transfers made by guilds to rulers, the tax exemptions obtained by guilds,
and the membership restrictions imposed by guilds. All these implications of the model
are amply borne out by the historical evidence reviewed in Section 2.
In addition, our theory sheds light on a number of other historical observations. First,
it clearly follows from our analysis that rulers had an interest in supporting merchant
guilds, but not also separate guilds of producers/suppliers, such as producers of agricul-
tural commodities supplied to merchants and then sold by the latter to consumers. The
emergence of such agricultural guilds would have given rise to ine¢ ciencies associated with
double marginalization - and indeed, medieval rulers did not support the establishment
of such guilds. A similar argument applies to craft guilds, except of course where crafts-
men were also merchants, trading the commodities they produced. Again, the historical
evidence is consistent with this implication of our theory: craftsmen often belonged to
guilds that combined production and trade72, thereby obtaining recognition and privileges
from rulers; on the other hand, they struggled to obtain support from rulers when their
interests were in con￿ ict with those of merchant guilds73.
Second, another key feature of our analysis is to clearly identify the trade-o⁄s faced by
a ruler choosing between tax-farming, a single merchant guild or multiple merchant guilds.
As discussed in Section 2, merchant guilds were ubiquitous in medieval Europe, suggesting
that the trade-o⁄ between tax-farming and merchant guilds was typically favorable to
guilds. In terms of our model, this would be the predicted outcome when merchants
are su¢ ciently patient, and when merchant guilds￿monitoring ability (which depends
on cohesion and trust among members, and their resulting ability to overcome free-riding
incentives and cooperate to monitor e⁄ectively) is su¢ ciently high. The historical evidence
on merchant guilds￿social capital and monitoring ability suggests that this was very much
the case: merchant guilds were social groups or networks whose members participated in a
variety of social and religious activities together; they held regular assemblies and feasts;
when abroad, they lived in their own quarters of foreign cities and interacted closely.
Trust was clearly perceived to be very important: symbolically, English merchant guilds
required ￿an oath of fealty to the fraternity￿from new members74. In practice, close and
repeated interaction facilitated monitoring and the exchange of information; this, together
with the establishment of a variety of norms and sanctions for members who breached
72See Luchaire (1902), p.241, for some French examples, and Gross (1890), p.107, for some English ones.
In some cases, craftsmen were, to begin with, highly dependent on merchants, who supplied them with
necessary raw materials from other polities, and sold the ￿nished products in international markets. The
relationship between the two was then dominated by merchants (see Racine (1979), pp. 297, 714-715).
73See for example Dilcher (1984), p.71 and Fr￿lich (1934), pp. 36-37.
74Gross (1890), p.29 (quotation).
36them or helped others to breach them, helped to sustain trust. The social capital thereby
generated by merchant guilds was, according to our model, a key factor in￿ uencing rulers￿
support for the guilds over tax-farming.
Just as importantly, the analysis developed in Section 5 sheds light on the choice be-
tween establishing one or multiple guilds. In particular, we have shown that recognition of
multiple guilds should have been more likely when (a) each guild could target its monitor-
ing so as to exploit an informational comparative advantage, generating e¢ ciency gains
in monitoring, and (b) the probability of di⁄erent guilds recartelizing after a deviation
was su¢ ciently low. In small towns with low levels of international trade, the scope for
e¢ ciency gains in monitoring by multiple guilds must have been quite limited. In these
cases, as our model would predict, a single merchant guild was typically recognized and
granted privileges by the ruler. In contrast, rulers of important international trade cen-
ters (e.g. Bruges, Constantinople) generally recognized a number of guilds. Each guild￿ s
membership was normally quite homogeneous in terms of nationality, ethnicity and cul-
ture (e.g. Catalan, Genoese, Pisan, Venetian...) and very cohesive, with correspondingly
high abilities to monitor potential trading activities by non-members from their polities of
origin. Thus they satis￿ed condition (a) above. Cultural and ethnic homogeneity within
guilds also implied signi￿cant heterogeneity between guilds, suggesting that condition (b)
was satis￿ed as well; indeed, there is plenty of evidence of con￿ ict, sometimes violent,
between guilds.75
Finally, it is interesting to consider the implications of our analysis for city-states
ruled by merchant oligarchies. These represent, in a sense, an extreme form of collusion
between ruler and local merchants. Does this make local merchant guilds unnecessary?
Our model suggests that the answer is no: there is still a need for monitoring to extract
maximal surplus from trade. Indeed, most city-states whose governments were dominated
by mercantile interests possessed local merchant guilds. A notable exception was Venice, a
special case in many respects. Venice gained its autonomy (from the Byzantine emperor)
much earlier than other Italian city-states. Long before the tenth century, its ruling class
owned some land but was also involved in maritime trade: ￿As early as 829 the will
of Venetian Doge Justinian Partecipazio mentioned among his assets a substantial sum
(1,200 silver pounds) invested in oversea commercial ventures￿ (Lopez (1971), p.63). Thus
mercantile interests played a key role in Venice from very early on. Indeed, it is perhaps
the historical example that comes closest to ￿ perfect￿collusion between ruler and local
merchants. Yet it did not possess a local merchant guild. The puzzle is easily explained
75On this see Abula￿a (1978, 1986); Bahr (1911); Daenell (1905); De Roover (1963); Dollinger (1970);
Greif et al. (1994); Lloyd (1991); Postan (1973); Pryor (2000); Reyerson (2000); Sch￿tt (1980) and Smith
(1940).
37by observing that the city government itself took on the tasks that local merchant guilds
performed elsewhere: it established maritime regulations and withdrew the right to trade
from any Venetian merchant who breached them, or who breached ￿nancial contracts; it
imposed ￿nes for smaller breaches of mercantile rules; it monitored closely Venetian mer-
chant colonies abroad76. It also excluded alien merchants from many types of commercial
activity in Venice and required them to trade, when allowed to, only through Venetian
brokers77.
7. Concluding remarks
Understanding why merchant guilds emerged, and the role they played, matters not only
for historical interest, but also for current debates over institutions and social capital.
Merchant guilds have been widely regarded as an example of how social capital can ben-
e￿t whole societies and economies. We have revisited the rationale for the emergence of
merchant guilds, examining the implications of their comparative advantage in monitoring
and hence their role as an e¢ cient mechanism to sustain collusion. Our theory suggests
that merchant guilds did indeed generate some e¢ ciency gains, but these gains bene￿ted
only part of the population (in particular, rulers and guilded merchants). By modeling
explicitly the dynamic incentives of individual merchants, and analysing the role of the
guilds￿social capital, we have been able to to shed light on a number of important his-
torical observations. Moreover, our analysis provides a theoretical framework capable of
accounting for the basic trade-o⁄s involved when a polity￿ s ruler had to choose between
granting recognition to a single or multiple guilds. This helps us to understand the ob-
served distribution of guilds, and provides a rationale for the establishment of both local
and alien merchant guilds, consistent with the historical evidence.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of this result is immediate. Indeed, given A2, one
can easily show that it is strictly dominant for the tax-collector to pay the monitoring
cost c in each period and extract all the surplus from the merchants if he expects them
to collude e¢ ciently. Moreover, if merchants expect the tax collector to monitor in each
period, they will charge the monopoly price. In fact, in this case, they would be indi⁄erent
between colluding and price at the marginal cost anyway as all the surplus they get from
the market is taken away by the zero-pro￿t tax imposed by the agent. Hence, there
exists a SPNE of the game where the tax collector monitors in each period and merchants
collude. Notice that if N > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) this equilibrium is also unique. Indeed, in this
case, a SPNE where the tax-collector does not monitor cannot exist because individual
deviations will always be pro￿table for any equilibrium candidate where merchants get a
pro￿t lower than c. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1: Part (i) can be immediately established by the de￿nition of ￿￿ (￿;n).
Indeed, for this cut-o⁄ value to be positive one must have n < n(￿): The proof of
part (ii) rests, instead, on the idea that in order for the ruler to grant recognition to a
merchant guild, the minimum size condition n ￿ n must be compatible with the necessary
condition for collusion to enforceable at least in some state ￿, that is n < n(￿). Given
the de￿nition of n(￿), and the fact that inf fng = 2, it is immediate to show that the
necessary conditions for a guild to be recognized are ￿ > 1=2 and n < n(￿). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: First, observe that ￿￿ (￿;n) ￿ 1 is a necessary condition for
collusion to be fully e¢ cient in all states ￿ 2 ￿. Hence, solving ￿￿ (￿;n) = 1 yields the
maximum n, in the text denoted by n￿ (￿), which ensures that collusion is fully e¢ cient
in the whole support ￿. Then, observe that if n > n￿ (￿), granting recognition to a
merchant guild is incompatible with e¢ cient collusion, while the converse holds otherwise.
Therefore, for collusion to be e¢ cient in all states of nature one needs n < n￿ (￿). But, as
we have assumed inf fng = 2, a necessary condition for this to be true is that n￿ (￿) > 2.
This inequality yields immediately ￿ > 2=3, which provides a second necessary condition
45for collusion to be e¢ cient in all states. Moreover, in this case, the optimal guild size is
such that n 2 (n; n￿ (￿)] provided that this interval is non-empty. When n > n￿ (￿) the
minimum size constraint binds as ￿￿ (￿;n) < 1. In this case, the guild reaches its minimum
size n and collusion cannot be e¢ cient, i.e., for all states ￿ > ￿￿ (￿;n) merchants need to
price below the monopoly level. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: Of course, when ￿ ￿ 1=2 or n ￿ n(￿) the ruler cannot
implement the guild as in this case the minimum size requirement is incompatible with
the maximum size condition implied by Lemma 1. Hence, in this region of parameters
the ruler is forced to hire a tax-collector. If ￿ > 1=2 and n < n(￿), instead, the ruler will
always grant recognition to a merchant guild whenever this ensures e¢ cient collusion in
all states of nature, that is, if ￿ > 2=3 and n ￿ n￿ (￿) < n(￿) as shown in Proposition
2. Di⁄erently, when ￿ < 2=3 or n > n￿ (￿) collusion cannot be fully e¢ cient under the
guild regime. In this case, if the ruler decides to grant recognition to a guild he obtains
a intertemporal expected utility equal to
V
￿ (￿;n) = ^ V (￿;c) + ￿
h






0 ￿dF(￿) + (1 ￿ F (￿￿ (￿;n)))￿￿ (￿;n)
1 ￿ ￿
=
2(1 ￿ n(1 ￿ ￿))(n ￿ 1)
￿
2 :
Hence, granting recognition to a merchant guild is optimal if and only if W (￿;n) ￿
^ V (￿;c), that is






since E[￿] =1=2 under the uniform speci￿cation e ￿










Clearly, for c < c￿ (n;￿) hiring a tax-collector will be the ruler￿ s best choice. Finally,
showing that the threshold c￿ (:) is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in n within the relevant
range of parameters is immediate from (8.1). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof of this result follows the same logic as the proof of
Lemma 1. Since the individual incentive constraint (5.1) does not change when the
ruler considers granting recognition to both subgroups of merchants, in order for each
46merchant not to ￿nd it optimal to deviate from a ￿ grand￿collusive agreement, the total
number of active merchants must be limited. Using symmetry, this implies immediately
nj < n(￿)=2 = 1=2(1 ￿ ￿) for all j = 1;2, thus n < n(￿). ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof of this result rests on the idea that recognizing privileges
to both subgroups of merchants can be pro￿table only if this guarantees collusion to be
e¢ cient at least in some state ￿. For this to be true one needs to have b ￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0 and
￿￿ (￿;n) ￿ 0 for all n ￿ n. It is then straightforward to show that for ￿ < ￿(￿) and
n < n(￿;￿) these inequalities are satis￿ed altogether. However, ￿(￿) > 0 only if ￿ > 1=2
and n(￿;￿) > inf fng = 4 only if ￿ > ￿
￿ (￿), where
￿




Hence, the ruler will consider granting recognition to both guilds only if n < n(￿;￿),
￿ < ￿(￿) and
￿ > maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g:
This concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof of this result follows closely the logic of the proof
of Proposition 2. For collusion to be e¢ cient in the whole space of parameters it must
be b ￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 1 and ￿￿ (￿;n) ￿ 1. It can be immediately veri￿ed that these inequalities
can be jointly satis￿ed if and only if ￿ ￿ maxf￿
￿￿ (￿);2=3g, n ￿ n￿ (￿;￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (￿).
Conversely, if one of these conditions does not hold, collusion cannot be e¢ cient. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of this proposition is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 3 and the facts that: (i) ￿(￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ ￿ 1=2, and (ii) n(￿;￿) ￿ n(￿) for
￿ ￿ 1=2: ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof of this result follows the same lines as the proof
of Proposition 3. First, it is immediate to verify that ￿(￿;￿) is non-empty for ￿ < 1=2
and that only in the region of parameters where ￿ > maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g; ￿ < ￿(￿) and
n < n(￿;￿), the ruler will consider to grant recognition to both guilds. Then, it is
straightforward to show that if c = 0 the ruler will always prefer to hire the tax-collector
as this will provide e¢ cient collusion at no monitoring costs; while, if c = E[￿] = 1=2,
he will strictly prefer to grant recognition to both subgroups of merchants. Therefore, a
simple continuity argument implies that there must be a function c￿￿ (￿;n;￿;￿) such that
for all c < c￿￿ (￿;n;￿;￿) a tax-collector will be hired, di⁄erently privileges will be granted
to both subgroups of merchants. ￿
47Proof of Proposition 7: First, observe that restricting attention to cases where ￿ >
maxf1=2;￿
￿ (￿)g implies that the regime with two guilds is feasible. In the opposite case,
following the logic of Proposition 3, the result would be to recognize one guild or to hire
the tax collector.
In order to prove part (i) it is useful to remember that in the region of parameters
where ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) it must be true that b ￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0, so that the ruler will always prefer to
deal with one guild. Indeed, in this case, granting recognition to both subgroups renders
collusion impossible via the collective incentive constraint. Moreover, the same result
holds if ￿ = 1=2. In this case, there is no di⁄erence between the individual incentive
constraint with one or two guilds, i.e., having two guilds does not bring any e¢ ciency
gain; thus, dealing with one guild must be weakly preferred to deal with two. Finally, for
n < n￿ (￿) it must be true that one guild is e¢ cient, hence the ruler must (weakly) prefer
to deal with one guild.
The proof of part (ii) is simple. Indeed, when ￿ < 1=2, c ￿ c￿ (￿;n) and n 2
[n￿ (￿);n(￿)) the ruler has two options available: either he recognizes one or two guilds.
However, for n > n￿ (￿) having one guild does not guarantee e¢ cient collusion. In this
region of parameters, the ruler will clearly prefer to deal with two guilds if ￿ is small
enough since this would imply ￿￿ (￿;n) < ￿￿ (￿;￿n). Di⁄erently, if ￿ is large enough, say
for instance close to ￿(￿), having two guilds will never be optimal since, in such a case,
fully e¢ cient collusion will be enforced in a smaller subset of the support ￿ relative to a
single guild regime. A simple continuity argument then implies that there must exist a
function b ￿(n;￿;￿) such that for all ￿ < b ￿(￿;n;￿) the ruler prefers to grant recognition to
both guilds, and the converse holds true otherwise.
Finally, to prove part (iii) notice that for c < c￿ (￿;n) the ruler prefers the tax-collector
to a single guild regime. Hence, the same qualitative results as in Proposition 6 obtain.
￿
The bargaining game between the ruler and a single guild: Here we provide the
details of the bargaining game between the ruler and a single guild, which were omitted
from the main text for expositional convenience. Assuming that ￿￿ 2 [0;1] and using the




0 ￿dF(￿) + (1 ￿ F (￿￿ (￿;n)))￿￿ (￿;n)
1 ￿ ￿
; (8.2)
Once again, this equation captures the fact that the guild is successful in enforcing
e¢ cient collusion only if ￿ ￿ ￿￿(:). When instead ￿ > ￿￿(:), the pro￿t of every guild
member has to fall below the fully e¢ cient collusion level, ￿=n, because the incentive
48constraint (4.3) would not be satis￿ed otherwise. Clearly, if n can be chosen so as to





in the region of parameters where ￿￿ (￿;n) < 1, instead, simple integration yields
W (￿;n) =




U (￿;n;R) = W (￿;n) ￿ R;
be the guild￿ s expected intertemporal payo⁄ net of the royalty fee. The ruler chooses n
and R so as to solve the following Nash bargaining program:
P : max
(R;n)2<+￿[n;n(￿)]
(R ￿ ^ V (￿;c))
￿U (￿;n;R)
1￿￿ :
Where ^ V (￿;c) measures the ruler￿ s outside option, which is the expected payo⁄ he
would obtain by hiring a tax-collector. On the other hand, the outside option of the guild
is zero since single merchants would make zero pro￿ts if a tax-collector is hired. It is then
immediate to check that the solution of P entails:
R
￿ (￿;￿;c) = ^ V (￿;c) + ￿
h
W (￿;n) ￿ ^ V (￿;c)
i
; (8.3)
which also de￿nes the ruler￿ s pro￿t from granting recognition and privileges to a guild,
i.e., V ￿ (￿;￿;c) = R￿ (￿;￿;c). The guild obtains an intertemporal payo⁄ equal to
U
￿ (￿;￿;c) = (1 ￿ ￿)
h
W (￿;n) ￿ ^ V (￿;c)
i
; (8.4)
which is shared equally among its n members. As standard, equations (8.3) and (8.4)
are the solution of the Nash bargaining problem with weights ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿, according to
which the ruler and the guild share the total surplus de￿ned by the di⁄erence between
the intertemporal surplus from trade and the value of the ruler￿ s outside option, i.e.,
W (￿;n) ￿ ^ V (￿;c).
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